1.1 In 1986, on-load release hooks for lifeboats
and rescue boats were made mandatory in the SOLAS Convention, in response
to Norway’s worst offshore accident in March 1980, when the Alexander
Kielland platform in the North Sea Ekofisk field capsized,
killing 123 of the 212 persons on board. These then new SOLAS requirements
were considered an important step forward in lifeboat design.
1.2 Some deaths in that accident were attributed
to the fact that the lifeboat had no means of release when its weight
was on the hook and falls. Therefore, on-load release systems were
seen to offer benefits.
1.3 Since the IMO requirements for all ships to
be fitted with on-load release systems came into force, there have
been a number of serious accidents during drills and servicing.
1.4 Many of these accidents were attributed to
either lack of maintenance, poor design or inadequate training. Failures
of equipment can result in the premature opening of the on-load hook
mechanism, causing the lifeboat to fall from the davits unexpectedly,
even with three safety interlocks provided for in the design.
1.5 A number of current designs of on-load release
hooks are designed to open under the effect of the lifeboat’s
own weight and often need to be held closed by the operating mechanism.
This means that any defects or faults in the operating mechanism,
errors by the crew or incorrect resetting of the hook after being
previously operated, can result in premature release.
1.6 A “Fall Preventer Device” (FPD)
can be used to minimize the risk of injury or death by providing a
secondary alternate load path in the event of failure of the on-load
hook or its release mechanism or of accidental release of the on-load
hook. However, FPDs should not be regarded as a substitute for a safe
on-load release mechanism.