6 Security measures

6.1 Mitigating the risk of theft, piracy and armed robbery against non-SOLAS vessels ^footnote

6.1.1 Operators of non-SOLAS vessels should consider the risk to the vessel of theft, piracy and armed robbery and mitigate the risk by implementing appropriate security measures. The following are examples of good practice which may be implemented to reduce the likelihood of theft, piracy and armed robbery against non-SOLAS vessels:

i) Be vigilant

Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent. The majority of attacks will be deterred if the robbers/hijackers are aware that they have been observed. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms, alert coastal authorities, undertake evasive manoeuvring where possible, secure access points to the vessel and where appropriate and possible prepare defences such as water hoses. Pirates and armed robbers are usually well organized and equipped with weapons. Crew should not display aggressive responses, once an attempted boarding or attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the vessel, as this could significantly increase the risk to the vessel and those on board.

ii) Maintain a 24-hour visual and security watch

Security watch includes short range radar surveillance of the waters around the vessel. The use of a small marine radar, fitted in such a way to ensure complete coverage of the stern, un-obscured by the radar shadow of the vessel itself, should be considered. Keep a special look-out for small boats and fishing boats that attackers often use because they are difficult to observe on radar. In piracy “hotspots”, discourage passengers and crew from trading with locals using small craft which may approach the vessel.

iii) Strengthen night watches

Strengthen night watches especially around the rear of the vessel and anchor chains/mooring ropes and particularly between the hours of 0100 and 0600 when most attacks occur. Continuous patrols linked by “walkie-talkie”to the bridge should be established, especially in high risk ports of transit areas. A drill should be established for regular two-way communication between the watch and the bridge. If possible, an additional officer should assist the normal bridge watch keepers at night, in order to provide a dedicated radar and visual watch for small craft that might attempt to manoeuvre alongside, and allow the watch keepers to concentrate on normal navigational duties. Night patrols of the vessel should be staggered to avoid forming patterns which an adversary could observe.

iv) Seal off means of access to the vessel

Fit hawse pipe plates, lock doors and secure hatches, etc. While taking due account of the need for escape in the event of fire or other emergency, so far as possible all means of access to the accommodation should be sealed off and portholes and doors of crew members' quarters should be secured at all times. Where applicable blocking access between the aft deck and the crew members' quarters is particularly important.

v) Establish radio contact

Establish radio contact and agree on emergency signals specifically for attacks with crew, shore authorities, etc.

vi) Provide adequate lighting

Deck and over-side lights, particularly at the bow and stern, should be provided to illuminate the deck and the waters beyond and to dazzle potential boarders. Searchlights should be available on the bridge wings, and torches should be carried by the security patrols to identify suspicious craft. Such additional lighting should not however be so bright as to obscure navigation lights or interfere with the safe navigation of other vessels.

vii) Evasive manoeuvring

Provided that navigational safety allows, Masters may consider “riding off” attacking vessels by heavy wheel movements as they approach or by attempting to out run the attackers vessel. The effect of evasive manoeuvring may deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling devices.

viii) Water hoses and other equipment

A vessel's rear deck is vulnerable to attempted boarding by robbers/hijackers and as an option can be sprayed with water to deter an attempted boarding. The use of water hoses to deter boarding of robbers/hijackers should only be considered if the Master is convinced he can use them to advantage, and without risk of provoking reprisals from the attackers. Consider fitting or equipping the vessel with passive security/detection equipment, e.g., Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems, CCTV, Night Vision equipment. Where possible, such equipment should be linked to an alarm system.

ix) Reduce opportunity for theft

Remove all portable equipment from the deck, so far as is possible stow containers containing valuables door-to-door and in tiers, and seal off access to accommodations.

x) Establish a secure area (s)

If large numbers of armed robbers/hijackers succeed in boarding the vessel, it may be necessary for crew members and passengers to retreat to a secure area(s). Depending upon the construction of the accommodations and the extent to which areas can be effectively sealed off, such a secure area should be identified in advance. Provision should be made, however, for escape during a fire or other emergency.

6.2 Preventing unauthorized access to the vessel

6.2.1 Guidance on preventing unauthorized access to each of the four non-SOLAS vessel categories is set out in the Appendices.

6.3 Conducting a search of a vessel

6.3.1 The following are examples of good practice which should be implemented to assist crew undertaking patrolling duties when operating in a higher-risk environment:

Define the search area- crew members should be fully briefed and aware of what is required and have clearly defined start and finish points.
Plans- laminated plans of search areas should be produced in advance, highlighting the key features of the areas to be searched (such as storage bins and emergency exits).
Thoroughness- thorough searches help detect concealed items and attention should be paid to vulnerable areas. Crew should not rely solely on visual checks, but should take note of unusual sounds, smells, etc.
Use of seals- un-lockable equipment boxes such as lifejacket boxes can be fitted with tamper evident seals eliminating the need to search inside unless the seal is no longer intact.
Pre-planned action- crew members should be fully briefed on their expected actions in the event a search identifies a security concern.

6.4 Verifying identity of persons on board a vessel

6.4.1 The following are examples of good practice which could be implemented to verify the identity of persons on board a vessel when operating in a higher-risk environment:

All visitors (other than passengers) should report to the Master of the vessel, or other responsible person, to notify them of their arrival and departure. All visitors should have a form of identity, for example an ID card, passport or some other form of identification bearing the individual's photograph.
Passengers must present a valid ticket before boarding (except where tickets are bought on board the vessel) and where applicable have a form of identity such as an ID card, passport or some other form of identification bearing the individual's photograph. For chartered vessels where no tickets are required, the chartering party should give some thought as to how they will control access. This could be achieved through the provision of paper authorization such as an invitation to be shown or for names on a list to be checked off on presentation of identification.