Part 1 - Inspection Processes

 1 Introduction

1.1 When, during a port State control inspection, the port State control officer (PSCO) has clear grounds according to section 2.2 of the present Procedures, the following onboard operational procedures may be checked in accordance with this resolution.

1.2 However, in exercising controls recommended in these Guidelines, the PSCO should not include any operational tests or impose physical demands which, in the judgement of the master, could jeopardize the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, control officers or cargo. Prior to requiring any practical operational control, the PSCO should review training and drill records and should inspect, as appropriate, the associated safety equipment and its maintenance records. For example, an enclosed space entry drill may be sufficiently verified without an actual enclosed space entry by verifying drill records, maintenance records, physical inspection and physical demonstrations by crew of breathing apparatus, safety harnesses and atmosphere testing instruments.

1.3 When carrying out operational control, the PSCO should ensure, as far as possible, no interference with normal shipboard operations, such as loading and unloading of cargo and ballasting, which is carried out under the responsibility of the master, nor should the PSCO require demonstration of operational aspects which would unnecessarily delay the ship.

1.4 Having assessed the extent to which operational requirements are complied with, the PSCO then has to exercise professional judgement to determine whether the operational proficiency of the crew as a whole is of a sufficient level to allow the ship to sail without danger to the ship or persons on board, or without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.

1.5 When assessing the crew's ability to conduct an operational drill, the mandatory minimum requirements for familiarization and basic safety training for seafarers, as stated in STCW 1978, as amended, shall be used as a benchmark.

1.6 Definitions and abbreviations

The definitions and abbreviations used in this appendix are those of section 1.7 of the Procedures supplemented as follows:

2 Clear grounds

2.1 Clear grounds are defined in section 1.7.2 of the Procedures.

2.2 In addition to the general examples of clear grounds in section 2.4 of the Procedures, clear grounds related to operation requirements are listed in appendix 11 section 6.3.2 items.

3 More detailed inspection for operational requirements

3.1 A more detailed inspection should assess the ability of relevant crew to operate essential shipboard equipment that is relevant to their role. The responsible crew member must be able to operate such equipment independent of others and care must be taken to ensure they are not coached through the process when asked to demonstrate their understanding.

3.2 A more detailed inspection should assess the familiarity of crew to essential shipboard procedures relevant to their role, the safety of the ship and the protection of the environment.

3.3 The PSCO should make an overall assessment of the effectiveness of communication and interaction and familiarity of the crew, including the human interface.

3.4 The PSCO can use the items in section 5 below as guidance in assessing the ability of the master or crew member to operate the ship. The desired outcome is to effectively assess compliance with operational requirements in order that corrective action(s) may be applied where necessary.

3.5 Drills

A more detailed inspection may include drills. Where drills are to be conducted these should be carried out at a safe pace. PSCO(s) should not expect to see operational activities including drills conducted in real time. Care should be taken to ensure that all crew familiarizes themselves with their duties and with the equipment. If necessary, drills should be stopped or suspended if the PSCO(s) considers that the crew are carrying out unsafe practices or if there is a real emergency. In addition, the following should be considered:

• .1 the PSCO(s) should devise the emergency scenario on which a drill will be based in conjunction with the master. Experience has shown that the best assessment is achieved when the PSCO(s) devises and controls the scenario, (in collaboration with the master) since there is then an element of uncertainty on the part of the ship's officers as to how a drill will progress and is more realistic to the actual onboard situation facing crew members in a critical situation; and

• .2 it is essential that meetings are held between the PSCOs and key members of the ship's personnel before and after any operational activity involving multiple crew members. An initial briefing should be used to explain in general terms how the activity will be conducted and should also enable the ship's staff to recognize the PSCOs who are witnessing the activity, it is recommended that all PSCOs witnessing the drill wear distinctive high visibility clothing to distinguish them from crew members.

3.6 Meeting on inspection outcomes and findings with regard to operational requirements

At the conclusion of the inspection a meeting should held with the master to ensure there is a common understanding of the outcomes and any findings of the detailed inspection, to identify any shortcomings and, if appropriate, where operational activity did not meet the required standard.

4 Communication

4.1 The PSCO may determine if the key crew members are able to communicate with each other, and with passengers, as appropriate, in such a way that the safe operation of the ship is not impaired, especially in emergency situations.

4.2 The PSCO may ask the master which languages are used as the working languages and may verify whether the language has been recorded in the logbook.

4.3 The PSCO may ensure that the key crew members are able to understand each other during the inspection or drills. The crew members assigned to assist passengers should be able to give the necessary information to the passengers in case of an emergency.

4.4 Language difficulty between the PSCO(s) and non-English-speaking crews can make it difficult to put across the intentions for the conduct of the inspection and any associated drills. Care needs to be exercised when an unsatisfactory inspection outcome is found to ensure there is a differentiation between the miscommunication between the PSCO and the crew and failure of operational requirements.

4.5 Passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 2010 shall have on board a safety centre. The safety centre shall either be a part of the navigation bridge or be located in a separate space adjacent but having direct access to the navigation bridge.

4.6 The PSCO should verify effective means of communication between the safety centre, the central control station, the navigation bridge, the engine control room, the storage room(s) for fire-extinguishing system(s) and fire equipment lockers are provided.

5 Assessing the ship with respect to operational requirements

5.1 If any of the following are found during a more detailed inspection a detention of the ship may be considered:

• .1 failure of deck officers and crew to monitor cargo loading operations and take precautions appropriate to that cargo;

• .2 lack of awareness of the operation of, and limitations of, navigation equipment or how to test such equipment (including navigation lights);

• .3 deck officers unable to demonstrate the operation of essential navigation equipment such as ECDIS and integrated navigations systems. This includes the monitoring and interrogating alarms on such systems;

• .4 there is evidence that the ship's navigation has been carried out in an unsafe manner including, but not limited to:

  • .1 failure to monitor the ships position in accordance with shipboard procedures;

  • .2 failure to verify the accuracy of position-fixing through use of multiple means of obtaining fixes;

  • .3 failure to properly plan and assess a voyage; and

  • .4 navigating the ship into danger or into restricted areas;

• .5 deck officers unfamiliar with the operation and testing of radio communications equipment and/or the mechanism by which marine safety information is provided to the ship;

• .6 relevant officers and crew unfamiliar with the locations of the starting positions or the starting operation of the firefighting equipment such as the emergency fire pump or the release system for the fixed fire-fighting system;

• .7 relevant officers and crew lack awareness of the location, operation and coverage area of ventilation stops in the accommodation, engine-room and other protected areas;

• .8 officers and crew unaware of the location of fire alarm indicators in the accommodation and in the engine-room;

• .9 relevant officers and crew not aware of the location and operation of the fuel cut-off quick-closing valves for main engine and auxiliary engines;

• .10 relevant officers and crew unaware of the operation of life-saving equipment and how to effectively test such equipment;

• .11 relevant officers and crew unfamiliar with the operation of equipment, or procedures, intended to prevent maritime pollution; or

• .12 evidence of unsafe operations that pose a risk to life and the environment.

5.2 Observation by PSCO must be directly related to compliance with Convention requirements. In relating the deficiency, it is critical to note that having the necessary equipment installed and operational does not provide a capability as required by Convention unless the master and crew are familiar with the operation of the equipment and associated procedures as required by STCW Section A-I/4.4. Examples of deficiencies and relevant convention references are shown below:

• .1 engineer officer unable to demonstrate the operation of fuel oil valves provided in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-2/4.2.2.3.4 from outside the machinery space;

  • Note 1: This would be related to SOLAS regulation XI-1/4

• .2 engineer officer unable to demonstrate the operation of the sewage treatment plant required by Regulation 2 - Application of MARPOL Annex IV; and

  regulation 2

  • Note 1: This would be related to regulation 14 of MARPOL Annex IV.

    Note 2: Where the sewage treatment plant was found to be unserviceable or sewage had been discharged into the sea this should also be related as evidence of the failure of operational requirements.

• .3 (on a ship subject to SOLAS regulation V/19.2.10) deck officer unable to demonstrate the process of planning and conducting a navigational passage and unable to demonstrate how to determine the ship position using ECDIS.

  • Note 1: This could be related to SOLAS regulation XI-1/4, or section A-I/4.4 of STCW. Depending on the nature and scope of the issues either could be used, noting SOLAS has a broader scope.

6 Detailed guidance on assessing compliance with operational requirements

6.1 Detailed guidance on areas to be inspected is provided in part 2 of this appendix. Detailed guidance is divided into means of assessing compliance day to day activities and emergency preparedness. An assessment of compliance in respect of both should be undertaken where the circumstances warrant it.

6.2 The PSCO should consider requesting a drill be conducted where ship's records indicate that the specified drill has not been conducted in accordance with the Convention requirements.

7 Witnessing and assessment of drills

7.1 If a drill will involve passengers, it is prudent to provide as much notice as possible before the start of the drill to enable the master to inform the passengers about the drill. The information should be broadcast by public announcements in all relevant languages for the route concerned. The announcement should be repeated during the drill with appropriate intervals. The completion of the drill should be announced to the passengers.

7.2 During the conduct of a drill, the PSCO should consider questioning the crew members, particularly those assigned to assist any passengers, in order to get an impression of the safety awareness on board the ship.

7.3 When witnessing a drill, the PSCO should seek:

• .1 confirmation that the crew follow what is required of them by the muster list;

• .2 confirmation that there are sufficient personnel assigned to the various parties to cope with the duties given to them;

• .3 confirmation that there is an effective means of communication between the party, the party leader and the bridge, and that relevant information is being exchanged;

• .4 confirmation of the efficiency of the crew working as a team. This would be based on questioning of personnel and observation of their actions, the response times should be noted of the various parties in assembling at their stations and the reaction of the parties to unplanned events should also be noted;

• .5 confirmation that key members of the crew are able to understand each other;

• .6 confirmation of the efficiency of the equipment used, for example:

  • .1 that the fire alarms are audible and efficient;

  • .2 that the fire and watertight doors close as required; and

  • .3 that items of personal fire-fighting equipment appear well maintained; and

• .7 confirmation that the response time was considered fast enough (taking into account safety of the drill as indicated in paragraph 2.5.4 of this appendix), considering the size of the ship and the locations of fire, personnel and fire-fighting equipment.

7.4 In the case of evacuation or abandon ship drills:

• .1 confirmation that the escape arrangements for passengers/crew from lower decks are adequate, that the assembly or muster stations are clearly indicated, that the crew are familiar with the layout of the ship and are able to respond to changes in circumstances, for example directing passengers so as to avoid a smoke filled area; and

• .2 confirmation that the boat lowering party is proficient and that boats are lowered and ready for embarkation with ancillary equipment deployed.

7.5 If the PSCO determines that the crew are unfamiliar with their duties or incapable of safely operating the life-saving and fire-fighting equipment, the PSCO should halt the drill, notify the master that the drill was unsuccessful and use their professional judgement to establish the next steps, noting the likelihood that this will establish "clear grounds" for a more detailed inspection.

7.6 Having assessed the extent to which operational requirements are complied with, the PSCO(s) should then exercise their professional judgement to determine whether the operational familiarity of the crew as a whole is of sufficient level to allow the ship to sail without danger to the ship or persons on board, or presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.

8 Detention under operational requirements

8.1 Paragraph 3.1.1 and sub-paragraph 3.1.1.4 of the Procedures identify a substandard ship as being one where operational safety is substantially below the standards required by the relevant convention and specifically, in the case of operational requirements, where there is:

• "insufficiency of operational proficiency, or unfamiliarity of essential operational procedures by the crew"

8.2 In such cases the relevant operational requirements provisions of conventions require the port State to take such action as necessary to bring ships into compliance where it is found that the master and/or crew are unfamiliar with essential shipboard procedures. The following provisions are relevant:

• .1 SOLASregulation XI-1/4;

• .2 MARPOL Annex I, regulation 11;

• .3 MARPOL Annex II, regulation 16.9;

• .4 MARPOL Annex III, regulation 9;

• .5 MARPOL Annex IV, regulation 14;

• .6 MARPOL Annex V, regulation 9;

• .7 MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 10; and

• .8 STCW, Article X and regulation I/4 and section A-I/4.