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Regulation
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Interpretations
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II-2/21.4 Safe Return to Port/Fire Casualty
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Interpretation 12
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| Steel pipes other than
those carrying flammable liquids and passing through (not serving) spaces
affected by a fire casualty may be considered to remain operational provided
they are of substantial thickness (reference can be made to ICLL 66
regulation 22(3), as interpreted by IACS UI LL36/Rev. 2 paragraph (b)) or
"A-60" insulated ("A-60" class insulation approved in accordance with
resolution A.754(18) for bulkheads or decks may be used for this
purpose). In both cases the pipes should be adequately supported.
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| In order to be considered
as remaining operational after a fire casualty, steel pipes should be joined
by welding otherwise mechanical joints should be tested according to IACS UR
P2.11.5.5.6 fire test or equivalent to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
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| Temperature increase of
liquids carried may need to be considered, and measures taken where
necessary, so that the performance and purpose of the affected systems can
be maintained as intended after the casualty has occurred.
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| Plastic pipes can be
considered to remain operational after a fire casualty if tested to resolution A.753(18), Level 1.
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II-2/21.4 Safe Return to Port/Fire Casualty
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Interpretation 13
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| Fire-resistant cables
complying with standards IEC 60331-1 and IEC 60331-2 (see also IACS UR E15)
passing through (not serving) spaces may be considered to remain operational
after a fire casualty provided they have no connections, joints and
equipment connected to them, etc., within the space affected by the
casualty.
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| Installation of these
cables should be made to support their survival in a fire casualty and
during fire fighting efforts.
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II-2/8.1 Flooding casualty II-2/21 Fire casualty
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Interpretation 14
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| An electrical balance
should be submitted for each of the following return to port
scenarios:
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a) minimum electrical-generating capacity available;
and
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b) any other scenario of reduced power that would
cause any essential system to run at reduced capacity due to lack of
electrical generating capacity.
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| In connection with the
above, all essential systems and their auxiliaries and systems needed to
support safe areas should be accounted according to their use in these
particular conditions.
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II-2/21 Fire casualty
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Interpretation 15
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| Emergency generator,
fitted for compliance with SOLAS
regulation II-1/42, may be used to meet the requirements on safe
return to port and ship's orderly evacuation and abandonment providing that
its ability to supply emergency services as referred to in SOLAS
regulation II-1/42.2, is not impaired (e.g., the availability of
fuel needed for providing those services listed in regulation
II-1/42 should be maintained). In the evaluation of the emergency
generator capacity, the most demanding condition between regulations
II-1/42, II-2/21 and 22
may be considered.
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II-2/21.4 Safe return to port
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Interpretation 16
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| Electrical power should
be available and sustainable for all essential services specified in SOLAS regulations II-2/21.4 and II-2/21.5.1.2, with due regard being paid to such
services as may be operated simultaneously. The application of regulation II-2/21.4 requires that other systems
(e.g., engine-room ventilation, lighting of spaces outside safe areas not
affected by the casualty, etc.) remain operational to support the
functionalities listed therein.
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II-2/21.4.1 Propulsion
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Interpretation 17
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| Propulsion machinery and
auxiliary machinery essential for the propulsion of the ship should remain
operable.
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II-2/21.4.1 Propulsion
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Interpretation 18
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| Following a fire
casualty within the threshold, the ship should be able to maintain an
adequate speed for sufficient time to permit the ship's planned safe return
to port in sea and wind conditions acceptable to the Administration taking
into account the intended area of operation. A minimum speed of 6 knots
while heading into Beaufort 8 weather and corresponding sea conditions is
recommended. Configuration for power generation and propulsion in the worst
case scenario in terms of casualty cases should be verified during normal
sea trials.
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II-2/21.4.1 Propulsion
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Interpretation 19
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| A steel shaft line
including relevant bearings passing through a space affected by a flooding
or a fire casualty (see also interpretation 11), may be considered
operational if it is enclosed in a watertight and "A" class tunnel or
alternatively if:
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a) in the flooding case it can be shown that it can
operate under water; and
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b) in the fire case it is protected by a dedicated
water spray system capable of delivering not less than 5
⋉/m2/min on the protected area or equivalent.
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II-2/21.4.1 Propulsion
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Interpretation 20
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| Manual control at local
positions can be accepted provided adequate communication and emergency
lighting are arranged and it is demonstrated that the loss of any control
and monitoring system does not prevent or impair any such manual/local
control of the propulsion and electrical power generation systems
(including, but may not be limited to, engines, electric motors, fuel
system, etc.). Consideration should be given to the provision of machinery
alarms when operating in that manner.
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II-2/21.4.2 Steering systems and steering-control
systems
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Interpretation 21
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| When documenting that
steering system is operable the following should be taken into
consideration:
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a) local control of remaining steering system is
acceptable provided adequate communication and emergency lighting are
arranged;
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b) emergency means of steering, e.g., azimuth
thrusters, pump jets, rudder, propellers, may be considered; and
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c) in general, tunnel thrusters should not be
considered adequate for emergency steering.
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II-2/21.4.3 Navigation systems
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Interpretation 22
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| Equipment essential for
navigation, position fixing and detection of risk of collision should be
available. The ship should be capable of displaying the proper light
configuration in compliance with the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea in force.
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II-2/21.4.4 Systems for fill, transfer and service
of fuel oil
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Interpretation 23
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| Systems for internal
fill transfer and service of fuel oil should be capable of fuel transfer to
active propulsion and power generation equipment.
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II-2/21.4.4 Systems for fill, transfer and service
of fuel oil
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Interpretation 24
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| Systems for internal
fill, transfer and service of:
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a) fuel;
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b) other flammable hydrocarbons; or
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c) any fluid that may be flammable or dangerous if
heated to a very high temperature (both within the pipe and on going
through pumps, orifices or other equipment),
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operational within spaces affected by a fire casualty.
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II-2/21.4.5 Internal communication between the
bridge, engineering spaces, safety centre, fire-fighting and damage
control teams, and as required for passenger and crew notification and
mustering
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Interpretation 25
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| Internal communications
should be achieved by any effective portable or fixed means of
communications. However, portable equipment may be accepted provided that
repeater system or equivalent remains operational after the casualty and
charging capability is available in more than one MVZ.
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II-2/21.4.5 Internal communication between the
bridge, engineering spaces, safety centre, fire-fighting and damage
control teams, and as required for passenger and crew notification and
mustering
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Interpretation 26
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| PA systems, arranged as
general alarm systems, should remain operational in the MVZs not affected by
the casualty.
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II-2/21.4.6 External communication
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Interpretation 27
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| The ship should be
capable of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF Marine and Air Band
distress frequencies, even if the main GMDSS equipment is lost.
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II-2/21.4.7 Fire main
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Interpretation 28
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Automatic start of
remaining pumps may not be necessarily required (manual local start may be
accepted after a casualty). The system should be so arranged that SOLAS regulation II-2/10.2.1.5.1 is fulfilled in all
other Main Vertical Zones of the ship not affected by the casualty.
Isolating valves should be arranged as appropriate. The remaining part of
the affected deck in a Main Vertical Zone may be served from hydrants of
adjacent zone or water tight compartment. Fire hoses may be extended for
fire-fighting within the affected Main Vertical Zone; however, for complying
with this requirement, two lengths of hoses from each hydrant may be
accepted.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 29
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| When a gaseous based
system located outside the protected space is the sole fixed
fire-extinguishing system as defined in regulations II-2/10.4.1 and 10.7.1 and it is designed to protect more than one
space:
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a) there should be enough capacity to protect the two
largest spaces;
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b) where the application of the fire casualty
threshold leads to the loss of the storage room due to fire in an
adjacent space, there should be two rooms, not being lost by the result
of the same casualty, each holding a quantity of gas, capable of
protecting the largest space; and
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c) the system should be so arranged that a casualty
in one protected space does not impair the operation of the system in
another protected space.
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| When a gaseous based
system located outside the protected space is the sole fixed
fire-extinguishing system as defined in regulations II-2/10.4.1 and 10.7.1 and it is designed to protect a single space,
where the application of the fire casualty threshold leads to the loss of
the storage room due to fire in an adjacent space, there should be two
rooms, not being lost by the result of the same casualty, each holding the
quantity of gas required for the protected space.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 30
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| Sprinkler or equivalent
fixed fire-extinguishing systems may be considered to be lost only in spaces
directly affected by the fire casualty and in other spaces that are
protected by the same section (i.e. are controlled by the same section
valve) provided each section should not serve more than one deck area in one
MVZ. However, all levels of a stairway enclosure may be protected by the
same section.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 31
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| Section valves (as
referred to in FSS Code, chapter 8, paragraph 2.4.2.2) located within the space affected
by the fire casualty should be considered to be not operational unless they
are suitably fire rated or fire protected (e.g., contained within a solely
dedicated enclosure having "A" class boundaries, or protected by a water
nozzle, etc.).
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 32
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| Equivalent water based
fire-extinguishing systems intended for the protection of machinery spaces
(total flooding, as referred to in MSC/Circ.1165, as amended) should be so designed that
in case of loss of any section valve it would still be possible to supply
the entire system at the required performance, except where another fixed
fire-extinguishing system is provided for the protection of such spaces
(e.g., gaseous based systems). Duplication, fire protection of valves (e.g.,
contained within a solely dedicated enclosure having "A" class boundaries,
or protected by a water nozzle, etc.), fire rated valves* or location of
valves in spaces as identified by interpretation 11 may be considered.
_______________ * Reference may be made to IACS UR P2.11.5.5.6.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 33
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| Indication of activated
sections in the continuously manned central control station for sprinkler or
equivalent fixed fire-extinguishing systems, located outside the Main
Vertical Zone, where the space affected by the casualty is located, should
continue to function after a fire or flooding casualty.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 34
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| Arrangement of piping
distribution for sprinkler systems or equivalent, or for water based fixed
fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces, may include isolation
valves, to ensure the system can be reconfigured as to remain operational
after a casualty, which should be kept to a minimum, clearly marked and
easily accessible. Valves whose uncorrected status may jeopardize the
operation of the system under normal condition should be provided with
status indication in the continuously manned control station.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 35
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| When sprinkler or
equivalent water based fixed fire-extinguishing systems include one or more
emergency feed, risers, connection, or other emergency means to comply with
this regulation, then hydraulic calculations (as referred to in the FSS
Code, chapter 8, paragraph 2.3.3.2) should take this into
account.
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II-2/21.4.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
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Interpretation 36
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| Local application
systems need not to remain operational following a casualty unless they form
part of a system for the protection of machinery spaces (total flooding, as
referred to in MSC/Circ.1165, as amended).
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II-2/21.4.9 Fire and smoke detection systems
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Interpretation 37
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| Fire and smoke detection
systems may be considered to be lost only in spaces directly affected by the
fire casualty and in other spaces on the same deck that are part of the same
section, as defined by the FSS Code, chapter 9, paragraph 2.4.1, provided that all other detectors
remain operational in any other decks served by that section.
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Bilge and ballast systems
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Interpretation 38
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| The bilge and ballast
pumping systems and all associated essential equipment should be operational
in all spaces served by the systems and not directly affected by the
casualty. Manual control at local positions may be accepted provided fixed
or portable means of communication are available from those positions to the
Safety Centre or the Engine Control room.
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II-2/21.4.11 Power-operated watertight and
semi-watertight doors
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Interpretation 39
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| Indication to show
whether each door is open or closed should be provided for any fire casualty
not exceeding the casualty threshold except for those doors in the boundary
of spaces directly affected by the casualty.
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II-2/21.4.13 Flooding detection systems
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Interpretation 40
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| Flooding detection
systems may be considered to be lost only in spaces directly affected by the
fire casualty and in other spaces in the same compartment that are part of
the same section provided that all other detectors remain operational in any
other compartment served by that section.
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II-2/21.5 Safe areas
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Interpretation 41
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| When considering a fire
casualty in a certain MVZ, only spaces within the casualty threshold are to
be considered lost. Food, water and equipment for the support of the basic
services to the safe areas, stored in spaces not directly affected by the
fire casualty and belonging to the same MVZ, could be considered still
available.
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II-2/21.5.1.1 Safe areas Functional requirements
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Interpretation 42
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| Safe areas could be a
number of spaces distributed on board and should preferably be arranged in
accommodation spaces. Sizing of safe areas where persons are accommodated
could be based on the time needed for safe return to port operation. For
safe return to port operations longer than 12 h a minimum space of 2
m2 per person, calculated on the basis of the gross deck
surface of the space(s) being considered, should be provided. For safe
return to port operations shorter than 12 h a minimum space of 1
m2 per person should be provided.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.1 Safe areas, sanitation
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Interpretation 43
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| As a minimum one toilet
for every 50 persons or fraction should remain operational. Grey and black
water can be disposed of into the sea, allowed by MARPOL (reference MARPOL
Annex IV, regulation 3).
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II-2/21.5.1.2.2 Safe areas, water
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Interpretation 44
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| As a minimum 3 litres per
person per day drinking water should be available. Additional water for food
preparation and hygiene may need to be provided.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.3 Safe areas, food
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Interpretation 45
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| Food could be of any
kind including dry food. Storage of food should be distributed as necessary,
so that an access route is available from the safe areas.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.4 Safe areas Alternate space for
medical care
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Interpretation 46
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| In addition to the ship's
hospital or medical centre one or more locations on the ship should be
provided which should:
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a) be in a different Fire Zone (from the hospital or
primary medical centre);
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b) be easily accessible; and
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c) have lighting and power supply on the main and
emergency source of electrical power.
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| Reference should also be
made to MSC/Circ.1129.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.6 Means of preventing heat stress
and hypothermia
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Interpretation 47
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| Definition of means for
protection against heat stress and hypothermia should take into account
external weather conditions, which may depend on area(s) of operation of the
vessel. Casualty scenarios for which there is a reduction in ventilation or
heating capacity should be identified and consequences assessed. The
temperature within the internal safe areas should be maintained in the range
of 10 to 30°, consideration being paid to the external temperature during
expected operations.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.7 Safe areas, light
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Interpretation 48
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| Portable rechargeable
battery operated lighting may be acceptable for use in spaces which are not
covered by the ship's emergency lighting system. Adequate charging
capability should be available for these lights. Supplementary lighting
complying with regulation II-1/42-1 is also acceptable.
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II-2/21.5.1.2.8 Safe areas, ventilation
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Interpretation 49
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| Ventilation volume
should be available as a minimum of 4.5 m3/h per person.
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II-2/21.4.14 Safe areas, other systems vital to
damage control efforts
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Interpretation 50
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| This includes any system
that the Administration determines is vital to damage control pertaining to
fire or flooding.
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II-2/21.5.1.4 Safe areas, access to embarkation
deck
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Interpretation 51
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| Means of access from
safe areas to life-saving appliances should be provided from all safe areas
in case of any casualty, either internally through areas unaffected by the
fire or via external routes. External routes are considered to remain
available also in the portion of the ship containing the MVZ where the
casualty had occurred.
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II-2/22.3.1 Evacuation and abandonment, Systems
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Interpretation 52
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| Electrical power should
be available for the abandonment of the ship, including life-saving
appliances and arrangements and the systems referred to in SOLAS
regulation II-2/22.3.1, with due regard being paid to such
services as may be operated simultaneously.
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II-2/22.3.1.1 Evacuation and abandonment, Fire
Main Safe
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Interpretation 53
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| The fire main should
remain operational in all main vertical zones not directly affected by the
casualty. Water for fire-fighting purposes should be available to all areas
of the ship.
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II-2/22.3.1.2 Evacuation and abandonment, Internal
communications
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Interpretation 54
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| A means should be
available for communicating orders to fire-fighting and damage control teams
and personnel in charge of evacuation and abandonment.
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II-2/22.3.1.4 Evacuation and abandonment, Means of
external
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Interpretation 55
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The ship should be
capable of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF Marine and Air Band
distress frequencies even if the main GMDSS equipment is lost.
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II-2/22.3.1.3 Evacuation and abandonment, Bilge
system
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Interpretation 56
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The bilge pumping system
and all associated equipment essential for its operation should be available
in all spaces not directly affected by the casualty.
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