7.6 Survival Craft Launching and Recovery Arrangements:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), launching and embarkation appliances complying with the requirements of section 6.1 of the LSA Code shall, unless expressly provided otherwise, be provided for all survival craft except those which are;

• (a) provided for use in conjunction with a marine evacuation system, complying with the requirements of section 6.2 of the LSA Code and stowed for launching directly from the stowed position under unfavourable conditions of trim of up to 10° and list of up to 20° either way.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to vessels carrying survival craft and launching and embarkation appliances provided in accordance with the full provisions of Chapter III of SOLAS.

(3) Each lifeboat shall be provided with an appliance which is capable of launching and recovering the lifeboat and in addition there shall be provision for hanging-off the lifeboat to free the release gear for maintenance.

(4) Launching and recovery arrangements shall be such that the appliance operator on the ship is able to observe the survival craft at all times during launching and for lifeboats during recovery.

(5) Only one type of release mechanism shall be used for similar survival craft carried on board the ship’

(6) Preparation and handling of survival craft at any one launching station shall not interfere with the prompt preparation and handling of any other survival craft or rescue boat at any other station.

(7) Falls, where used, shall be long enough for the survival craft to reach the water with the ship in its lightest seagoing condition, under unfavourable conditions of trim of up to 10° and list of up to 20° either way.

(8) During preparation and launching, the survival craft, its launching appliance, and the area of water into which it is to be launched shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power required by Regulation 42 or 43 of Chapter II-1 of SOLAS, as appropriate.

(9) Means shall be available to prevent any discharge of water onto survival craft during abandonment.

(10) If there is a danger of the survival craft being damaged by the ship’s stabiliser wings, means shall be available, powered by an emergency source of energy, to bring the stabiliser wings inboard; indicators operated by an emergency source of energy shall be available on the navigation bridge to show the position of the stabilizer wings.

(11) If partially enclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.5 of the LSA Code are carried, a davit span shall be provided, fitted with not less than two lifelines of sufficient length to reach the water with the ship in its lightest seagoing condition, under unfavourable conditions of trim of up to 10° and list of up to 20° either way.

(12) Survival craft and rescue boat launching appliances may deviate from the requirement of section 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, for the use of stored electrical power, under the following provisions:

• (a) All other applicable elements of the LSA Code and the Code are met;

• (b) Each source of stored electrical power should:

  • (i) serve one launching appliance only;

  • (ii) be configured to only be utilised by the launching appliance during an emergency, after the vessel’s main and emergency power sources have failed;

  • (iii) be suitable for use in the marine environment with appropriate rating given the location and redundancy of components;

  • (iv) be located in a space independent from any other sources of stored electrical power, protected from the effects of fire and flooding & in accordance with the vessel’s Classification Society rules;

  • (v) be located in a space adjacent to the launching appliance it serves;

  • (vi) have capacity to power the launching appliance during deployment of all the survival craft or rescue boat it serves twice (including the deployment of any covers, bulwarks or similar required for the operation of the appliance;

  • (vii) be independently monitored and alarmed on the bridge, ECR and safety centre;

  • (viii) independently charged from the vessel’s main and emergency power sources; and

  • (ix) be able to power the launching appliance on the opposite side of the vessel (when also in compliance with 7.6(12)).

• (c) The cabling serving each source of stored electrical power, and the cabling serving the launching appliance from the source of stored electrical power should:

  • (i) be protected from the effects of fire and flooding throughout their length;

  • (ii) not to be led through high risk spaces; and

  • (iii) be independently run from the charging, cross powering, and powering cables.

• (d) Where a hydraulic system is driven by the source of stored electrical power, this should:

  • (i) serve one launching appliance only;

  • (ii) be located in a space independent from any other hydraulic systems serving launching appliances, protected from the effects of fire and flooding;

  • (iii) be located in a space adjacent to the launching appliance it serves;

  • (iv) be able to cross power the hydraulic system serving the launching appliance on the opposite side of the vessel (when also in compliance with 7.6(12)); and

  • (v) the hydraulics also to be powered from main and emergency source before batteries called into use.

• (e) The maintenance of each source of stored electrical power should:

  • (i) be in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions;

  • (ii) the system equipment should be included in that identified in the vessels Safety Management System in accordance with the ISM Code section 10.3;

  • (iii) include testing as per either IEEE 450/1188/1106 as appropriate or another internationally recognised standard; and

  • (iv) not exceed the service life given by the manufacturer.

• (f) Discharge capacity test to be completed at delivery & as required thereafter in-line with the manufacturer’s instructions;

• (g) A quantitative analysis is to be carried out as a part of a detailed assessment of all critical components to the acceptance of the Administration. As an example, the following may be performed:

  • (i) Quantitative analysis of fire risk within a space, supplemented by fire engineering analysis and/or fire testing where necessary (e.g., to assess consequences of a fire casualty on a system or system component);

  • (ii) Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) of a system or system component analyses in accordance with standard IEC 60812, Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) or Annex 4 of the HSC 2000 Code - International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft, 2000 (Procedures for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), would be acceptable; or

  • (iii) Detailed analysis of possibility of flooding of internal watertight compartments and of consequences of flooding on system components, given the location of the compartment and arrangement of piping within the compartment.